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Abstract 
This paper calculates the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) for Chinese listed companies by 
using the Merton-KMV model during the period from 2000 to 2010 and examines the predictive 
power the of the Merton-KMV model. We construct some logit regression models and regress 
the indicator of default on DLI and other variables that may be important in predicting default. 
The results reveal that Merton-KMV is a significant model to predict default in Chinese market, 
however it is not a sufficient model since we can improve the predictive performance of the 
Merton-KMV model by adding financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity. In 
addition, it is found that the functional form of the Merton-KMV model adds value to that of the 
inputs for the model. Finally we draw the power curve for the Merton-KMV model, the pure 
accounting model and a hybrid model that combine DLI calculated from the Merton-KMV model 
and financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity. We find that the hybrid model 
outperforms the other two models and the accounting model is the weakest one.  
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1. Introduction 
Due to the recent global financial crisis which triggers a great number of corporation 
defaults (Moody's, 2009), as well as the innovation in the corporate debt and 
derivative products, both academics and practitioners have shown renewed interest in 
default risk modeling. One of the most frequently studied forecasting models is the 
Merton-KMV model, which is derived from the ground-breaking work of Merton 
(1974) and its most successful commercial variant - KMV model.  
The original Merton model argues that corporation defaults occur when the value of 
the firm’s assets fall below a certain threshold (the default point), more specifically, 
the book value of the firm’s debt (Tudela & Young, 2005). With the simplifying 
assumption that a firm only consists of equity and zero-coupon debt and that the 
firm’s asset value is log normally distributed, the original Merton model provides a 
clever method to calculate the market value as well as the risk of the firm’s claims by 
viewing the equity of the firm as a call option on the underlying value of the firm with 
a strike price equaling to the face value of the firm's debt. The KMV model invented 
by KMV Corporation1 in 1993 is one of the most successful commercial variants of 
the Merton model. The most critical contribution of the KMV model to the original 
Merton model is its relaxing some simplifying assumptions that are violated in 
practice. The KMV model applies the framework of the Merton model to identify the 
“Distance to Default” (DD) of the firm and then translates it to the “Expected Default 
Frequency” (EDF) by using a proprietary database2
                                                             
1 Moody’s purchased KMV Corporation in February 2002 and merged it with Moody's Risk Management Service 
(MRMS) to create Moody's KMV. In this paper, the terms KMV and Moody’s are used respectively to refer to KMV 
Corporation and Moody’s before this acquisition took place.  
, which obtains the relationship 
2 “The database includes over 250,000 company years of data and over 4,700 incidents of default or bankruptcy. 
From this data, a lookup or frequency table can be generated which relates the likelihood of default to various 
levels of distance-to-default. For example, assume that we are interested in determining the default probability 
over the next year for a firm that is 7 standard deviations away from default. To determine this EDF value, we 
query the default history for the proportion of the firms, seven standard deviations away from default that 
defaulted over the next year. The answer is about 5 basis points (bp), 0.05%, or an equivalent rating of 
AA.”—Moody’s (2003). 
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between DD and EDF from data on historical default and bankruptcy frequency. 
However, due to the fact that the database is propriety information, dozens of 
academic researchers establish a “feasible” KMV-like model (we call it Merton-KMV 
model in this paper), which captures the framework of the original Merton model and 
some of the technical details from KMV model, to generate the default risk of the 
firms and examine the predictive power of this Merton-KMV model3
This paper is trying to calculate the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI)
. 
4
First, the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law became effective since June 2007. With the 
enforcement of the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the development for bankruptcy 
process for firms in China is expected to create a huge impact (Altman, Zhang, & Yen, 
2007). Therefore it is important to identify the financial distress for listed firms thus 
give an early warning to relevant stockholders.  
 for 
Chinese listed companies by using the Merton-KMV model and identify the 
predictive power of the Merton-KMV model by using data of Chinese listed 
companies. There are four important reasons to do so.  
Second, although considerable researches have been carried out, previous researches 
that put efforts forward modeling risk focus on the developed market, in other words, 
little attention has been paid to developing market, such as Chinese market, despite 
the fact that Chinese financial market has been playing an increasingly significant role 
in recent years with the ever-elevating globalization and integration of the world’s 
economy. This paper is trying to geographically enrich the research in default risk 
                                                             
3 Examples include Crosbie and Bohn (2003), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Tudela & Young (2005), Patel and Vlamis 
(2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and etc. We will further discuss the empirical studies and the detail of the 
models in the following section. 
4 Vassalou and Xing (2004) argue that strictly speaking, the so called “Probability of Default” derived from the 
Merton-KMV model is not a default probability because “it does not correspond to the true probability of default 
in large samples. In contrast, the default probabilities calculated by KMV are indeed default probabilities because 
they are calculated using the empirical distribution of defaults. For that reason, we do not call our measure 
default probability, but rather default likelihood indicators (DLI)”. Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), we call the 
measure of default probability from the Merton-KMV model as DLI in this paper. 
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modeling by taking the empirical studies in Chinese market.  
Third, most of the previous studies conducted by Chinese researchers define defaulted 
firms as “PT” 5 firms or “ST”6 firms. “ST” firms refer to the domestic listed 
companies with the stock losses for two consecutive years7. To better protect investors, 
China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) decided in March 1998 to 
differentiate those firms in financial difficulties by launching a new policy to offer 
“ST” to such firms. “PT” firms refer to the domestic listed companies with the stock 
losses for three consecutive years8
Fourth, different from relevant studies in developed market, most of the previous 
studies conducted by Chinese researchers choose a small study sample for their 
researches. The relative small sample makes the results less convincing. In this paper, 
the full list of the companies that alive in 2010 and issue A-shares
. Since July 9, 1999 Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange have implemented special transfer service for such kind stocks and named 
them “PT”. Intuitively using the accounting model (or just the accounting ratio alone) 
rather than the Merton-KMV model, an equity market based model, is the most 
efficient way to predict defaults. In other words, there is no need to use the more 
complex Merton-KMV model to differentiate the “ST” firms or “PT” firms from 
healthy firms as the previous studies do. In this paper, default firms are defined as 
delisted firms. Although the law does include bankruptcy as one possible solution to 
resolve distress, liquidation and asset possession rarely happen in China as they do in 
America. In fact, no listed firms have ever been actually filed for bankruptcy before 
2010 in China. Being delisted in China is in fact equivalent to going bankruptcy.  
9
                                                             
5 PT is short for Particular Transfer. 
 in Shanghai and 
6 ST is short for Special treatment 
7 Companies have negative cumulative earnings over two consecutive years or net asset value (NAV) per share 
below par value (book value). 
8 Companies have negative cumulative earnings over three consecutive years or net asset value (NAV) per share 
below par value (book value). 
9 A-shares are specialized shares of the Renminbi currency that are purchased and traded on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. This is contrast to B-shares which are owned by foreigners who cannot purchase 
A-shares due to Chinese government restrictions. Since A-shares better represent the Chinese market, we just 
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Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are studied and the study period stretches from 2000 to 
2010. This is supposed to make the results more plausible. However due to the data 
availability as well as the fact that there are very few defaults in China compared with 
those in America, our studies include a relative small number of defaults. This may 
influence our results to some extends.  
Following Bharath & Shumway (2008), this paper assesses both the reliability and 
efficiency of the Merton-KMV model. The reliability of the Merton-KMV model in 
predicting default is tested by regressing the indicator of default on the “Default 
Likelihood Indicators” (DLI)” calculated from the Merton-KMV model. The 
efficiency of the estimation is examined by testing whether the predicting power of 
the Merton-KMV model can be improved by adding other variables10
This paper reveals that generally the annual aggregate “Default Likelihood Indicators” 
(DLI), defined as a simple average of the DLI of all firms, is lower in China than that 
in America. In addition, it is found that the Merton-KMV is a significant method to 
predict default in Chinese market. However the Merton-KMV is not a sufficient 
method since we find that we can improve the performance of the Merton-KMV 
model by adding some accounting variables. Moreover the functional form of the 
Merton-KMV model adds value to that of the inputs for the model. These findings are 
in line with those revealed by Bharath & Shumway (2008). Finally we draw the 
power curve for the Merton-KMV model, the pure accounting model and a hybrid 
model that combine DLI calculated from the Merton-KMV model and financial ratios 
measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity. We find that hybrid model outperforms 
the other two models and the accounting model is the weakest one. 
.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review of the theoretical development on Merton-KMV model and some recent 
relevant empirical studies. Section 3 gives brief introduction of Chinese institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                              
include A-shares in our sample. 
10 The details of the method are showed in section 4.  
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background. Section 4 outlines the methodology that will be used in this paper, as 
well as the sample and data selection criteria. Section 5 describes the data on Chinese 
listed companies. Section 6 discusses the results. Finally the paper will be wrapped up 
by the conclusions in section 7.  
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2. Literature review 
The Merton-KMV model is in essence an equity market based model, the calculations 
of which use publicly available information on equity market. Other default risk 
models include accounting models and bond market based models. In this section, the 
framework and development of the Merton-KMV model will be presented. This is 
followed by a brief introduction of the accounting models and bond market based 
models as well as the comparison between the equity market based models and the 
other two types of models. Finally some recent empirical studies that are close to this 
paper will be given.  
2.1 The framework and development of the Merton-KMV 
model  
2.1.1 The Merton model  
The Merton model is a very clever application of classic financial theory (Bharath & 
Shumway, 2008). Merton (1974) argues that the equity of a firm can be viewed as a 
call option on the firm’s assets with the exercise price as the value of the firm’s debt 
so that we can apply the Black-Schole option pricing formula to calculate the value of 
firm’s claims. All his deduction is based on the following two simplifying but salience 
assumptions: 
1) The total value of the firm’s asset follows geometric Brownian motion 
𝑑𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
= 𝜇 ∙ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝑑𝑍𝑡                                   (2.1.1.1) 
where 𝐴𝑡  is the value of the firm’s assets on any date t, with an 
instantaneous drift 𝜇 and an instantaneous volatility 𝜎𝐴, and 𝑍𝑡 is a 
standard Wiener process.  
10 
 
2) The firm only has equity and a single issue of zero-coupon debt with face 
value of F and maturity T in its capital structure.  
Based on the assumptions mentioned above, Merton (1974) shows that the equity of 
the firm can be modeled as an option on firm value with the strike of F and maturity T. 
The underlying logic is quite simple. If AT exceeds F on date T, equityholders will 
receive the amount of (AT - F). Otherwise, i.e. AT 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐴𝑇 − 𝐹, 0}                                                 (2.1.1.2) 
< F, equityholders will receive 
nothing. The payoffs received by equityholders at time T thus can be written as  
where 𝐴𝑇 is the value of the firm’s assets on date T (the maturity of the firm’s debt), 
𝐹 is the face value of the firm’s debt. It is clear that (2.1.1.2) is exactly the payoffs 
from longing a call option on the firm’s assets with the strike of F and maturity T. 
Referring to the Black-Scholes pricing formula, the value of the equity price can be 
written as  
𝐸𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑁(𝑑2)                              (2.1.1.3) 
where 𝐸𝑡 is the market value of the firm’s equity on any date t, r is the riskless 
interest rate, and  𝑁(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 in this equation is given by  
𝑑1 = 𝑙𝑛�𝐴𝑡𝐹 �+�𝑟+𝜎𝐴22 �(𝑇−𝑡)𝜎𝐴√𝑇−𝑡                                            (2.1.1.4) 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴√𝑇 − 𝑡                                             (2.1.1.5) 
Since that the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets, 
the observable volatility of the equity can be expressed as a function of the 
unobservable volatility of the firm value from Ito’s lemma and it is showed as 
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𝜎𝐸 = 𝐴𝑡𝐸𝑡 ∙ 𝑁(𝑑1) ∙ 𝜎𝐴                                              (2.1.1.6) 
where 𝜎𝐸  is the volatility of the firm’s equity, 𝑁(𝑑1) is the hedge ratio from 
(2.1.1.3). 
Given (2.1.1.3) and (2.1.1.6), the value and volatility of the firm’s underlying assets 
can be calculated from the observable variables―𝐸𝑡, 𝜎𝐸, F, T and r. 
Similarly, the firm’s outstanding debt can be modeled as a portfolio of longing a 
default-risk-free zero coupon bond with face value of F and shorting a put option on 
the firm’s asset with the exercise price of F. The payoffs received by debtholder at 
time T thus can be written as  
𝐹 −𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐹 − 𝐴𝑇 , 0}                                              (2.1.1.7) 
The expression above can be divided into two parts, respectively 𝐹 and −𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐹 −
𝐴𝑇 , 0}. The former term equals to payoffs from longing a riskless bond with the face 
value of F and maturity T while the latter term is the payoffs from shorting a put 
option on the firm’s with exercise price of F and maturity T. With such decomposition, 
the valuation of the firm’s debt can then be transformed into pricing the riskless bond 
and the put option  
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐹 ∙ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)                                                (2.1.1.8) 
where 𝐵𝑡 is the value of the riskless bond with face value of F and maturity T on any 
date t. In addition, the value of the put option can be obtained from the Black - 
Scholes pricing formula  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑁(−𝑑1)                            (2.1.1.9) 
𝑃𝑡 is the value of the put option on the firm’s asset with the exercise price of F and 
maturity T on any date t. 
12 
 
Given (2.1.1.2), (2.1.1.3) and (2.1.1.4), the value of the firm’s debt can be expressed 
as follows 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 = 𝐹 ∙ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) − �𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑁(−𝑑1)�    (2.1.1.10) 
𝐷𝑡 is the value of the firm’s debt with face value of F and maturity T on any date t. 
The implied value of 𝐴𝑡 R 
2.1.2 Some extensions of the Merton model in academic field 
and 𝜎𝐴 from (2.1.1.3) and (2.1.1.6) can then be translated 
into the value of the firm’s debt (𝐷𝑡) by using (2.1.1.10).  
The framework of the ground-breaking work by Merton booms the development of 
the default risk modeling. This branch of default risk modeling is known as “structural 
models”11
Examples of exogenous default models include Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), which 
argue that default happens when the value of firm’s assets falls below an exogenous 
default boundary, which depends on the face value of the debt (Patel & Pereira, 2007). 
Different from the Merton model, which assumes the short-term riskless interest is 
constant, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) argue that the short-term riskless interest rate 
is a stochastic process that converges to long-term riskless interest rate and it is 
negatively correlated to asset value process. In addition, Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) take the bankruptcy cost into consideration.  
 and can be divided into two categories, respectively exogenous default 
models and endogenous default models. In exogenous default models, default happens 
whenever the assets’ value falls below a default boundary. While in endogenous 
models default is chosen by management to maximize equity values.   
Endogenous default models were introduced by Black and Cox (1976). In endogenous 
                                                             
11 Another branch of default risk predicting models are called as reduced form models. Different from the 
structure models which argue that a firm defaults when its asset value drops to its debt value, reduced form 
models view the default of a firm as an event that happens unexpectedly and this branch of models are inspired 
by the work of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). 
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default models, equityholders face the tradeoffs between keeping the equity “alive” 
and paying for the debt holders. If the value of firm’s assets exceeds the default 
boundary, equityholders will choose to keep the firm running and paying the 
debtholders, otherwise they will choose default. The default boundary is determined 
not only by debt principal, but also by the riskiness of the firm’s activities (as 
reflected in value process), the maturity of debt issued, payout levels, default costs, 
and corporate tax rates (Leland, 2004). 
2.1.3 The Merton-KMV model 
In addition to the great development in the academic area, experts in commercial area 
have made a remarkable progress concerning the default risk measurement inspired 
by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) since 1990s. KMV model released 
by KMV Corporation in 1993 is one of the most outstanding achievements. KMV 
model estimates the default of a firm according to a three-step procedure: 1) estimate 
the current market value and the volatility of the firm’s assets; 2) determine the 
“Distance to Default” (DD); 3) scale the DD to “Expected Default Frequency” (EDF). 
The most significant contribution of the KMV model is its construction of a database 
that showing the relationship between DD and the EDF from observing the US 
company histories. The EDF of the firm with a specific DD can be obtained by 
referring to the database. However due to the fact that the database is propriety 
information, some academic researchers establish a “feasible” KMV-like model to 
illustrate some of the technical details of estimating the EDF. The details of the 
calculation are as follows. 
First, calculate the market value and the volatility of the firm’s assets. The market 
value and the volatility of the firm’s assets can be calculated by solving (2.1.1.3) and 
(2.1.1.6) as showed above. However most of the empirical studies12
                                                             
12 see Crosbie and Bohn (2003), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Patel and Vlamis (2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), 
and ect.. 
 argue that “the 
relationship between 𝜎𝐸 and 𝜎𝐴 from (2.1.1.6)) holds only instantaneously, and in 
14 
 
practice, the market leverage moves around far too much for (2.1.1.6)) to provide 
reasonable results”. To solve the problem, an iterative procedure is usually introduced 
as follows.  
Step 1: Propose a start guess value of 𝜎𝐴, and use this value to extract 𝐴𝑡 from 
(2.1.1.3).  
Step 2: Calculate the log return on assets using 𝐴𝑡 extracted in the previous step, and 
derive 𝜎𝐴 and 𝜇 using the log return on assets.  
Step 3: Repeat step 1 and step 2 until convergence is achieved. 
Second, identify the “Default Point” (DP, which is the same to F mentioned above). 
Vassalou & Xing (2004) argue that “the interest payments of the long-term debt are 
parts of short-term liability. In addition, the size of the long-term debt affects the 
firm’s ability to roll over its short-term debt, and therefore reduce the default risk.” 
Thus it is very important to include long-term debt in the calculation. Following KMV, 
the F is usually be defined as 
𝐹 = 𝑆𝑇𝐷 + 0.5𝐿𝑇𝐷13P                                           (2.1.3.1) 
where F is the Default Point, STD is the short-term debt and LTD is the long-term 
debt. This setting is based on KMV Corporation’s empirical observation and it is 
argued that the choice of using 50% of the log-term debt is sensible and captures 
adequately the financing constrains of firms.  
Third, deduce the “Probability of Default” (or EDF in KMV model). With the 
implied market value and the volatility of the firm’s assets from the iterative 
calculation above, and the F from (2.3.1), the “Probability of Default” (or EDF in 
                                                             
13 Vassalou and Xing (2004) demonstrate that they examined the variation of the ratio long-term debt to total 
debt across size and BM quintiles. The results show that overall speaking the difference in the ratios is not deem 
large enough to alter the qualitative results (Vassalou & Xing, 2004). Thus in this paper, we use (2.1.3.1) to derive 
the face value of the firm’s debt. 
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KMV model) can be written as follows  
𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟{𝐴𝑡 ≤ 𝐹|𝐴0 = 𝐴′} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡 ≤ 𝑙𝑛𝐹|𝐴0 = 𝐴′}               (2.1.3.2) 
𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑡 is the “probability of default” by time t, 𝐴′ is the market value of the firm’s 
assets at time t, and F is the face value of the firm’s debt which expires at time t and 
can be calculated from (2.1.3.1) above. Vassalou and Xing (2004) argue that strictly 
speaking, the so called “Probability of Default” derived from (2.1.3.2) is not a default 
probability because “it does not correspond to the true probability of default in large 
samples. In contrast, the default probabilities calculated by KMV are indeed default 
probabilities because they are calculated using the empirical distribution of defaults. 
For that reason, we do not call our measure default probability, but rather default 
likelihood indicators (DLI)”. Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), we call the 
measure of default probability in (2.1.3.2) as DLI in this paper. 
Given that the value of the firm’s assets follows the stochastic process as described in 
(2.1.1.1) and the initial value is 𝐴′, the market value of the firm’s assets at time t is  
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐴′ + �𝜇 − 𝜎𝐴22 � 𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴 ∙ √𝑡 ∙ 𝜀                               (2.1.3.3) 
where ε is the random component of the firm’s return. 
According to (2.1.4.1) and (2.1.4.2), the DLI can be written as  
𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟 �𝑙𝑛𝐴′ + �𝜇 − 𝜎𝐴22 � 𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴 ∙ √𝑡 ∙ 𝜀 ≤ 𝑙𝑛𝐹�                      (2.1.3.4) 
and after rearranging 
𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟 �− 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐴𝐹 +�𝜇−𝜎𝐴22 �𝑡𝜎𝐴∙√𝑡 ≥ 𝜀�                                    (2.1.3.5) 
Under the assumption that ε is normally distributed, ε~N(0,1), (2.1.3.5) can be 
defined as  
16 
 
𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁 �− 𝑙𝑛𝐴′𝐹 +�𝜇−𝜎𝐴22 �𝑡𝜎𝐴∙√𝑡 �                                         (2.1.3.6) 
The Distance to Default (DD) is given by 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑙𝑛𝐴′𝐹 +�𝜇−𝜎𝐴22 �𝑡
𝜎𝐴∙√𝑡
                                              (2.1.3.7) 
Statistically, the result of the calculation from (2.1.3.7) can be interpreted as by how 
many standard deviations move in the assets’ value will the firm default (the default is 
assumed to happen when the value of the firm’s assets is lower than that of the debt).  
2.2 The accounting models and bond market based 
models 
2.2.1 The accounting models 
The accounting models use accounting data to predict the probability that a loan 
applicant or existing borrower will default or be delinquent (Mester, 1997). This 
branch of default risk models can be divided into two broad categories by the number 
of variables used within the model, namely univariate accounting model and the 
multivariate accounting model (Altman & Saunders, 1998). As it is argued by Altman 
& Saunders (1998) that the univariate accounting models compare various key 
accounting ratios of creditors with the industry norms whereas the multivariate 
accounting models combine and weight a bunch of key accounting variables to 
produce either a credit risk score14 (obtained in the multiple discriminant analysis 
model) or a probability15
                                                             
14 See Z-score model (Altman, 1968), ZATA-score model (Altman et al., 1977), and etc.. 
 (obtained in the linear probability model, the logit model or 
the probit model). In most accounting models, lower score indicates higher risk. For 
example, lower score indicates higher risk in the Z-score model (Altman E. I., 1968).  
15 See O-score model (Ohlson, 1980), and etc.. 
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Table 2.2.1.1 International survey of accounting models  
STUDIES CITED  EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
United States  
Altman (1968) EBIT/assets; retained earnings/assets; working capital/assets; sales/assets; 
market value (MV) equity/book value of debt. 
Japan  
Ko (1982) EBIT/sales; working capital/debt; inventory turnover 2 years 
prior/inventory turnover 3 years prior; MV equity/debt; standard error of 
net income (4 years). 
Takahashi, et. al.
（1979） 
Net worth/fixed assets; current liabilities/assets; voluntary reserves plus 
unappropriated surplus/assets; interest expense/sales; earned surplus; 
increase in residual value/sales; ordinary profit/assets; sales - variable 
costs. 
Switzerland  
Weibel (1973) Liquidity (near monetary resource asset - current liabilities)/operating 
expenses prior to depreciation; inventory turnover;debt/assets. 
Germany  
Baetge, Huss and 
Niehaus (1988) 
Net worth/(total assets – quick assets – property & plant); (operating 
income + ordinary depreciation + addition to pension reserves)/assets; 
(cash income - expenses)/short term liabilities. 
Von Stein & Ziegler 
(1984) 
Capital borrowed/total capital; short-term borrowed capital/output; 
accounts payable for purchases & deliveries/material costs; (bill of 
exchange liabilities + accounts payable)/output; (current assets -  
short-term borrowed capital)/output; equity/(total assets - liquid assets - 
real estate); equity/(tangible property - real estate); short-term borrowed 
capital/current assets; (working expenditure - depreciation on tangible 
property)/(liquid assets + accounts receivable - short-term borrowed 
capital); operational result/capital; (operational result + depreciation)/net 
turnover; (operational result + depreciation)/short-term borrowed capital; 
(operational result + depreciation)/total capital borrowed. 
England  
Marais (1979), Earl 
& Marais （1982） 
Current assets/gross total assets; 1/gross total assets; cash flow/current 
liabilities; (funds generated from operations - net change in working 
capital)/debt. 
Canada  
Altman and Lavallee 
(1981) 
Current assets/current liabilities; net after-tax profits/debt; rate of growth 
of equity – rate of asset growth; debt/assets; sales/assets. 
The Netherlands  
Bilderbeek (1979) Retained earnings/assets; accounts payable/sales; added value/ assets; 
sales/assets; net profit/equity. 
van Frederikslust 
(1978) 
Liquidity ratio (change in short term debt over time); profitability ratio 
(rate of return on equity). 
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Table 2.2.1.1  (continued) 
STUDIES CITED  EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Spain  
Fernandez (1988) Return on investment; cash flow/current liabilities; quick ratio/ industry 
value; before tax earnings/sales; cash flow/sales; (permanent funds/net 
fixed assets)/industry value. 
Italy  
Altman, Marco, and 
Varetto (1994) 
Ability to bear cost of debt; liquidity; ability to bear financial debt; 
profitability; assets/liabilities; profit accumulation; trade indebtedness; 
efficiency. 
Australia  
Izan (1984) EBIT/interest; MV equity/liabilities; EBIT/assets; funded debt/ shareholder 
funds; current assets/current liabilities. 
Greece  
Gloubos & 
Grammatikos (1988) 
Gross income/current liabilities; debt/assets; net working capital/assets; 
gross income/assets; current assets/current liabilities. 
Brazil  
Altman, Baidya, & 
Ribeiro-Dias (1979) 
Retained earnings/assets; EBIT/assets; sales/assets; MV equity/ book value 
of liabilities. 
India  
Bhatia (1988) Cash flow/debt; current ratio; profit after tax/net worth; interest/ output; 
sales/assets; stock of finished goods/sales; working capital management 
ratio. 
Korea  
Altman, Kim & Eom 
(1995) 
Log(assets); log(sales/assets); retained earnings/assets; MV of 
equity/liabilities. 
Singapore  
Ta and Seah (1981) Operating profit/liabilities; current assets/current liabilities;EAIT/paid-up 
capital; sales/working capital; (current assets  - stocks - current 
liabilities)/EBIT; total shareholders ’ fund/liabilities; ordinary 
shareholders’ fund/capital used. 
Finland  
Suominen (1988) Profitability: (quick flow –  direct taxes)/assets; Liquidity: (quick 
assets/total assets); liabilities/assets. 
Uruguay  
Pascale (1988) Sales/debt; net earnings/assets; long term debt/total debt. 
Turkey  
Unal (1988) EBIT/assets; quick assets/current debt; net working capital/sales; quick 
assets/inventory; debt/assets; long term debt/assets. 
Whenever possible, the explanatory variables are listed in order of statistical importance (e.g., the size of the coefficient term) 
from highest to lowest. Source: (Allen, DeLong, & Saunders, 2003). 
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Accounting models have been frequently applied in both academic researches and 
practice16
On the one hand, the abundant studies on accounting models reveal that such models 
are predominately limited to the quality and availability of the balance sheet data, and 
the assumption of linearity. In addition it is argued that the volatility of the firm’s 
assets
 on their establishments. The previous studies not only apply different 
methodological approaches (e.g. the multiple discriminant analysis model, the linear 
probability model, the logit model or the probit model), but also utilize use different 
kind of accounting variables. Table 2.2.1.1 from Allen, DeLong, & Saunders (2003) 
gives a brief overview of previous empirical studies on accounting models.  
17
On the other hand, accounting models are relatively inexpensive to implement. And 
most studies found that financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity 
had the most statistical power in differentiating defaulted from non-defaulted firms.  
 contains important information about the firm’s default risk, however 
accounting models do not take into account the volatility of the firm’s assets in 
estimating its default risk as equity market based models do. Moreover accounting 
models are blamed to use the accounting data from historical financial statement 
which is inherently backward looking while the equity market based models apply the 
market value of the firm’s equity, which reflects the expectation of the firm’s future 
performance (Vassalou & Xing, 2004). All these showed above make equity market 
based models superior default forecasting models compared with accounting models.  
Since information contained in these financial ratios is by no means included in 
Merton-KMV model, some previous studies argue that we can combine financial 
ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity with the Merton-KMV model to 
increase the predictive power of the Merton-KMV model. For example, Keenan & 
                                                             
16 For example, a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve board shows that “97 percent of the responding banks 
that use credit-scoring in their credit card lending operations use it for approving card applications” (Federal 
Reserve Board, 1996). 
17 For example, Campbell and Taksler (2003) reveal that the volatility of the firm and credit ratings can explain 
the cross-sectional variation in corporate bond yields as well as credit rating (Vassalou & Xing, 2004).  
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Sobehart (1999) found that by adding information such as profitability, we can 
significantly improve upon a model that uses a stricter interpretation of the Merton 
framework (Keenan & Sobehart, 1999). Thus in this paper we will also add financial 
ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity, in conjunction with the 
Merton-KMV model to see if we can improve the predictive power of the 
Merton-KMV model.  
2.2.2 The bond market based models 
As it comes to the bond market based models, one may utilize corporate bond spread 
or bond rating to calculate firms’ default risk.  
A firm defaults when it fails to meet the obligation of paying its debt. This default risk 
induces creditors to ask for a spread over the risk-free rate. Thus the excess return 
from the corporate bonds relative to the risk-free rate of interest would reveal the 
default risk of the firm. However a number of empirical studies18
Rating agencies group borrowers into several rating grades. Default probabilities are 
assigned to a grade by calculating the observed default rate of all borrowers within 
this grade in each year and averaging these figures over a historical horizon. Patel & 
Vlamis (2007) provide a table which matches of different levels of theoretical DLI 
and risk rating according to Standard and Poor’s rating services (see table 2.2.2.1).  
 have shown that 
default risk only takes up a small percentage of the spread and extracting the former 
one from the latter is a non-trivial spread-decomposition work (Tudela & Young, 
2005).  
  
                                                             
18 See Elton et al. (2001), Huang and Huang (2002), Colllin-Dufresne et al. (2001), and etc.. 
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Table 2.2.2.1 DLI and bond rating symbols  
DLI (in basis 
points) 
Corresponding 
S&P rating 
Interpretation 
0-2 AAA Highest quality: Extremely strong capacity. Excellent 
business credit, superior asset quality. 
2-4 ≥AA Highest quality: Extremely strong capacity. Excellent 
business credit, superior asset quality, excellent debt 
capacity and coverage; excellent management with 
depth. Company is a market leader and has access to 
capital markets. 
4-10 AA-A High quality, very strong capacity. Good business 
credit, very good asset quality and liquidity, strong 
debt capacity and coverage, very good management 
in all positions. Company is highly regarded in 
industry and has a strong market share. 
10-19 A-BBB Strong payment capacity. Average business credit, 
within normal credit standards: satisfactory asset 
quality and liquidity, good debt capacity and 
coverage, good management in all positions. 
Company is of average size and position within the 
industry. 
+ 
19-40 BBB+-BBB- Adequate payment capacity. Acceptable business 
credit, but with more than average risk, acceptable 
asset quality, little excess liquidity, modest debt 
capacity. May be highly leveraged. 
Requires above-average levels of supervision and 
attention from lender. Company is not strong enough 
to sustain major setbacks. 
40-72 BBB- Likely to fulfill obligations. -BB 
72-101 BB-BB- Acceptable business credit but with considerable risk, 
acceptable asset quality, smaller and/or less diverse 
asset base, very little liquidity, limited debt capacity. 
Covenants structured to ensure adequate protection. 
May be highly or fully leveraged. May be 
below-average size or a lower-tier competitor. 
Requires significant supervision and attention from 
lender. Company is not strong enough to sustain 
major setbacks. 
101-143 BB--B Ongoing uncertainty + 
143-202 B+-B Watch list credit: generally acceptable asset quality, 
somewhat strained liquidity, fully leveraged. Some 
management weakness, requires continual supervision 
and attention from lender. 
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Table 2.2.2.1 (continued)  
DLI (in basis 
points) 
Corresponding 
S&P rating 
Interpretation 
202-345 B- B High-risk obligations. - 
345-1500 CCC+-CC Current vulnerability to default. Unacceptable 
business credit, normal repayment in jeopardy. 
Although no loss of principal or interest is envisioned, 
a positive and well-defined weakness jeoparizes 
collection of debt. The asset is inadequately protected 
by the current sound net worth and paying capacity of 
the obligor or pledged collateral. 
1500-2000 CC-D In bankruptcy or default. Expected total loss. An 
uncollectable asset or one of such little value that it 
does not warrant classification as an active asset. 
Such an asset may, however, have recovery or salvage 
value, but not to the point where a 
write-off should be deferred, even though a partial 
recovery may occur in the future.  
However it is worth noticing here that the philosophies are different for these two 
types of default risk forecasting methods: Through the Cycle (bond rating) versus 
Point in Time Ratings (Merton-KMV). Merton-KMV model reflects a borrower’s 
situation and the most likely future condition over an exactly pre-specified horizon 
(e.g. one year) while bond ratings focus on the long term over one or more business 
cycles. Thus DLI from the Merton-KMV changes as soon as the borrowers’ condition 
changes while an assigned bond rating is nearly constant overtime. In other words, 
DLI from the Merton-KMV is more volatile than bond rating.  
Source: (Patel & Vlamis , 2006).. 
In addition, when the movement of the bond from one grade to another is used to 
estimate the firm’s default risk, it implicitly but mistakenly assumed that bonds with 
similar grade share the same default risk which is just the average of the historical 
default risk (Vassalou & Xing, 2004). 
All the reasons listed above show that the bond market based models are not better in 
predicting firm’s default risk than equity market based Merton-KMV model. Thus the 
Merton-KMV is the method followed in this paper.  
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2.3 Recent empirical studies on Merton-KMV model 
Over the recent years, a number of researches have made their efforts to examine the 
contribution of the Merton-KMV model. Papers that examine the predictive power of 
the Merton-KMV model include Hillegeist et al. (2004), Tudela & Young (2005), Du 
& Suo (2007), Patel & Vlamis (2007), Duffie et al. (2007), Bharath & Shumway 
(2008), and etc.. Although most papers demonstrate that the Merton-KMV is a useful 
method in predicting default risk, researchers have not reached a consensus as to 
whether this model can be improved by adding other variables. Among all the 
empirical studies, Tudela & Young (2005), Patel & Vlamis (2007) and Bharath & 
Shumway (2008) provide a good framework and some helpful thoughts for this paper.  
Tudela & Young (2005) examine the reliability and efficiency of the Merton-KMV 
model in predicting the default risk of individual quoted UK companies. Tudela & 
Young (2005) collect 7,459 financial statements from 1990 to 2011, 65 of which 
correspond to default, and calculate the 1-year “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) 
annual average and the 2-year DLI annual average19
Patel and Vlamis (2007) argue that under the “risk neutral” DLI measurement, the 
expected return on the firm’s asset, is the riskless interest rate r. Based on the “risk 
neutral” assumption, Patel and Vlamis (2007) examine the DD and the “risk neutral” 
DLI for a sample of 112 real estate companies listed in UK during the period from 
1980 to 2001. The “risk neutral” DLI credits are then transformed to risk rating 
. By comparing the calculation 
results with the actual situation, Tudela & Young (2005) demonstrate that both of the 
1-year DLI annual average and the 2-year DLI annual average can be used to 
discriminate between the healthy firms and the defaulted firms. However Tudela & 
Young (2005) also reveal that the predicting power of the Merton-KMV model can be 
improved by incorporating company account information.  
                                                             
19 The 1-year DLI annual average is the simple average of the 1-year ahead DLIs in each month of the preceding 
calendar year while the 2-year DLI annual average is the simple average of the 2-year ahead DLIs, - from the 12th 
month before the default to the 24th before the default month.  
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according to Standard and Poor’s rating service, with which Patel and Vlamis (2007) 
are able to assess the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a specific 
obligation. The final results reveal that the Merton-KMV model correctly predicts the 
default when it did occur. However 12 out of 112 companies are mistakenly predicted 
to default when they are in fact healthy companies. Patel and Vlamis (2007) finally 
argue that their results support the theoretical idea of the Merton-KMV model that the 
two driving forces are high leverage and high asset volatility.  
Bharath and Shumway (2008) examine the accuracy and contribution of the 
Merton-KMV model by testing three hypotheses: 1) the DLI derived is a sufficient 
statistic for forecasting bankruptcy; 2) the functional form used to calculate DLI given 
above is an important construct for predicting default; 3) the solution of the 
Merton-KMV model is salient for predicting default. To test these hypotheses, 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) compare DLI from (2.1.4.5) with several other default 
forecasting variables and the following four alternatives: a. naïve DLI that derived 
from naïve alternative, which does not require iteratively solving (2.1.1.3) and 
(2.1.1.6) but mimics the function form (2.1.4.5); b. “risk neutral” DLI; c. PD from 
directly solving (2.1.1.3) and (2.1.1.6); d. DLI from using option-implied volatility of 
firm equity. By examine all firms in the section of the Compustat Industry file, among 
which 1449 firms default according to the Altman default database and the list of 
defaults published by Moody’s during the period from 1980 to 2003, Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) reveal that the Merton-KMV model is reliable but not an efficient 
method in predicting the default risk. 
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3.  Chinese institutional background  
As it is reported by Pedone & Liu (2010) that compared with developed market, 
Chinese market has witnessed a relative small number of bankruptcy filings, for 
example, 8,162 in March 2009 alone for America versus 2,90020
3.1 Security market  
 in 2009 for China 
(Pedone & Liu, 2010). The relative rarity of defaults in China may partly contribute to 
the special institutional environment in China. As these institutional factors will give 
us different definition of default compared with that used in American papers and thus 
influence our empirical results, in this section, brief introduction of Chinese 
institutional background will be given before we start our empirical research.  
3.1.1 Historical background of firms 
The security markets in China are quite different from developed market due to the 
historical background of firms. China maintained a centrally planned, or command, 
economy since its establishment in 1949 and until the end of 1978. Under the 
centrally planned economy, a majority of the firms were owned by the state, meaning 
that a number of listed firms are originally state-owned enterprises (hereafter SOEs) 
Although China has experienced the transition from the centrally planned economy to 
the market economy since 1978 and witnessed a great number of the SOEs being 
changed into corporate entities, China Corporate Governance Survey (2007) shows 
that the state still holds a majority share of the listed companies and SOEs constitute 
close to 90 percent of the total listed companies in China in 2005 (CFA, 2007). 
Moreover shares owned by the state are not allowed to be traded in the stock 
exchange. In other words, stocks in Chinese market are categorized into tradable and 
                                                             
20 Note that this data indicates the number of bankruptcy cases adopted by the courts in mainland China in 2009. 
And the definition of “bankruptcy” here is different to what is used in our empirical study later. In addition, the 
bankruptcy cases of non-listed companies are included here while in our empirical study showed later, only listed 
firms will be studied.  
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non-tradable share. Intuitively it is easier to manipulate the price for stocks with high 
non-tradable shares (Altman, Zhang, & Yen, 2007). Since one of the important inputs 
for the Merton-KMV model is the observable stock price, the “distorted” stock price 
may make the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) biased. More specifically DLI 
calculated from the Merton-KMV model may be lower than “actual” DLI since 
companies tend to cover the “bad” news.  
On April 29, 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) starts the 
Share Merger Reforms to convert non-tradable shares into tradable shares. The reform 
accelerates the process of the privatization, i.e. shifting the balance of share 
ownership from government ownership to public ownership by minority shareholders, 
especially among institutional investors, meaning that the shareholders of Chinese 
listed companies are more diversified after 2005. The diversification of the 
shareholders lowers the possibility to manipulate the price for stocks.  
3.1.2 Secondary Market  
In mainland China, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which 
are two membership institutions governed directly by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), provide places and facilities for centralized transactions. 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, which was first established in 1929 but closed in 1949 
during the Communist Revolution, was reopened in 1990. Opened in the same year, 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange is committed to “developing China’s multi-tier capital 
market system, serving national economic development and transformation and 
supporting the national strategy of independent innovation” (Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange , 2011).  
China’s secondary market is divided into three segments, respectively Main Board, 
Small and Medium Enterprises Board (hereafter SME Board) and ChiNext (also 
known as the “third board”). Main Board, just as the name implies, is the main place 
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that stocks are listed and traded. Stocks listed in Main Board usually belong to mature 
companies with relative large firm size and high level of profitability. SME Board was 
inaugurated on 27 May for small- and mid-caps with pronounced core business, high 
growth potential and intensive technological contents. Delisted distressed firms from 
Main Board and SME Board are moved to ChiNext and traded once a week rather 
than go bankruptcy directly. This is considered to protect investors from suffering 
giant losses without creating further social problem by keeping the problematic firms 
in regular board. The multi-tier capital market system may also contribute to the 
relative rarity of bankruptcy filings in China.  
3.2 Bankruptcy law and practice  
China has a relative short bankruptcy practice history compared with that of the 
developed market. There was no bankruptcy system in practice for more than thirty 
years after 1949, when the People’s Republic of China is announced to be established. 
The first bankruptcy law for SOEs was enacted in 1986. However the judicial system 
on bankruptcy is obsolete and law enforcement is weak. As it is described by Fan et al. 
(2008) that “Judges and attorneys alike often find themselves lack the specific clauses 
to resort to in the law or law enforcement to carry out what the court rules. As a result, 
the court system has been very conservative with bankruptcy-related petitions so as 
not to contradict the interpretation of the law. The court normally requires distressed 
firms to first obtain consent to their bankruptcy decisions from the local government 
and to propose a satisfactory plan to place its existing employees, before even 
considering handling the cases.” 
The new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which applies to all kind of enterprises, became 
effective since June 2007. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law gives an overall guild for 
bankruptcy practice in China but lacks details present in other insolvency statutes 
around the world (Pedone & Liu, 2010). The Supreme People’s Court, the highest 
court of the PRC, facilitates Enterprise Bankruptcy Law with the judicial 
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interpretations. Although introducing advanced market-orientated bankruptcy 
mechanics, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law has not file a single listed firm for bankruptcy 
yet. There may be two important reasons for the lack of use of Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law after it was implemented. One reason is that local government has much 
influence in deciding whether distressed firms should go through bankruptcy process. 
And usually the government tends to protect these firms by encouraging reconstruct 
rather that bankruptcy because: 1) the number of listed corporations under the 
governance of a local government is generally connected with the local economic 
prosperity and the officials’ performance (Li & Wang, 2009); 2) the top priority of 
such firms may be increasing the employment rather than making profit (Altman, 
Zhang, & Yen, 2007). The other reason is that China still generally lacks specialized 
bankruptcy courts, judges, and professionals familiar with bankruptcy proceedings 
(Pedone & Liu, 2010). 
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4.  Methodology 
4.1 Assumptions  
The Merton-KMV is based on some strict assumption. Before applying this model to 
calculate the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) for Chinese listed companies, we 
have to identify some of the important assumptions, which are listed as follows: 1) 
Chinese financial market is perfect (e.g. no arbitrage opportunity, no transaction cost, 
etc.); 2) firms’ asset value follows geometric Brownian motion. 
4.2 Sample selection 
Our empirical work begins with the definition of default. Previous studies in America 
usually define defaults as bankruptcy filings under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of 
the bankruptcy code. However, this definition is not suitable for this paper as it is 
showed in section 3 that by far China has no bankruptcy filings for listed firms due to 
the following reasons: 1) instead of directly going bankruptcy, the problematic firms 
are allowed to move from Main Board or SME Board to the third board; 2) the 
bankruptcy law is still in its initial phase and China lacks specialized bankruptcy 
courts, judges, and professionals familiar with bankruptcy proceedings; 3) Chinese 
government tends to protect listed firms from going bankruptcy. Thus default in this 
paper is defined more broadly as a firm being delisted from Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges for financial reasons 21
                                                             
21 “Typical financial reasons to delist a stock include failure to maintain market capitalization or stock price. 
Nonfinancial reasons to delist a stock include M&A.” (Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi, 2008) 
, an event that sometimes precedes 
bankruptcy or formal default (Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi, 2008). The time of 
default is the year of being delisted. Both the name of the delisted companies and the 
time of being delisted can be obtained from the website of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(http://www.sse.com.cn) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (http://www.szse.cn).  
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The surviving firms are the full list of the companies that alive in 2010 and issue 
A-shares22
1. Exclude the financial companies, the capital structure of which is 
distinguished from that of common ones.  
 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The surviving sample is then 
screened according to the following criteria: 
2. Exclude the “PT” companies and “ST” companies since their financial status 
are abnormal. 
3. Exclude the companies with incomplete data. 
The study period is from 2000 through 2010.   
4.3 Testing procedure 
4.3.1 Computing “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) 
Following Bharath & Shumway (2008), we start by estimating the “Default 
Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) for our whole sample using the Merton-KMV model 
showed in section 2. There are five important variables, respectively the market value 
of firm’s equity 𝐸𝑡, the volatility of the stock returns 𝜎𝐸, the riskless interest rate r, 
the face value of the debt, F, and the time period T.  
1. The market value of firm’s equity 𝐸𝑡 is calculated as the product of historical 
annual share price and the number of the share outstanding at the end of the 
year.  
2. The volatility of the stock returns 𝜎𝐸 is annualized standard deviation of the 
monthly equity return from the past 24 months.  
3. The face value of the firm’s debt, F, can be calculated from (2.1.3.1) 
mentioned above. The annual data for the book value of the short-term debt 
                                                             
22 A-shares are specialized shares of the Renminbi currency that are purchased and traded on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. This is contrast to B-shares which are owned by foreigners who cannot purchase 
A-shares due to Chinese government restrictions and they are measured by foreign currency.  
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and the long-term debt are used in this paper.  
4. As for the riskless interest rate r, we use the annual deposit interest rate, which 
can be obtained from the website of the People’s Bank of China. These annual 
deposit interest rates are then translated into annually continuous interest rate.  
5. The forecasting window, T, is set to be 1 year here. 
We use annual market data and annual accounting data here. The firm-level market 
data and accounting data mentioned above can be obtained from iFind23
4.3.2 Examine the significance and efficiency of the Merton-KMV 
model 
.  
After calculating the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) for our whole sample, we 
will examine the following three hypotheses.  
First, we will test whether the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) calculated from 
the Merton-KMV model is a significant statistic to predict default in Chinese market.  
Hypothesis 1 
H0
H
: DLI is a significant statistic to predict default in Chinese market. 
1
Second, we will examine whether the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) 
calculated from the Merton-KMV model is a sufficient statistic to predict default in 
Chinese market. As it is argued by Bharath & Shumway (2008) that if the “Default 
Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) is a sufficient statistic to predict default, it should be 
impossible to improve on the model’s implied probability for predicting. In other 
words, all the information needed to predict default is included in the “Default 
Likelihood Indicators” (DLI).  
: DLI is not a significant statistic to predict default in Chinese market. 
                                                             
23 iFind is a Chinese database that provides financial and economic data of Chinese market.  
32 
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0
H
: DLI is a sufficient statistic to predict default in Chinese market. 
1
Third, we will test whether the functional form used by the Merton-KMV model adds 
value for predicting default.  
: DLI is not a sufficient statistic to predict default in Chinese market. 
Hypothesis 3 
H0
H
: The functional form used by the Merton-KMV model adds value for 
predicting default. 
1
Different from Bharath & Shumway (2008) which employs a Cox proportional hazard 
model to test the three hypotheses, we construct a much simpler econometric model in 
this paper to assess the performance of the Merton-KMV model. First we need an 
indicator of default. Then we will regress indicator of default on the “Default 
Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) calculated from the Merton-KMV model to see if the it 
is statistically significant.  
: The functional form used by the Merton-KMV model does not add 
value for predicting defaults.  
It has been mentioned above that the defaulted firm in this paper is defined as a firm 
which is delisted from Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for financial reasons, 
thus the indicator of default equals 1 at time t-124
We then simply regress the binary indicator of the default on the 𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑡−1 calculated 
from the Merton-KMV model. Usually we use a linear probability model (LPM 
hereafter) to do the binary regression because it is simple to estimate and use. 
However it is worth noticing that the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which 
takes a number either of unity or zero. When using a LPM, the fitted probabilities can 
be less than zero or greater than one. Besides, the partial effect of any explanatory 
 if it is delisted from Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges for financial reasons at time t, and zero otherwise.  
                                                             
24 The predicting window is set to be 1 year in this paper. 
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variable estimated by LPM is constant (Wooldridge, 2009). These limitations of the 
LPM can be overcome by using more sophisticated binary response models, e.g. logit 
model. Thus we construct a dynamic logit model here as follows: 
𝑃𝑡−1�𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1� = 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼+𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1+𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼+𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1++𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�                                (4.3.2.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a binary indicator of default for firm i in any year t, which equals one if 
firm i is delisted for financial reasons in year t, and zero otherwise, in particular, the 
indicator is zero if the firm disappears from the data set for some reason other than 
bankruptcy such as acquisition, 𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1is the estimation from the previous year, and 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1is the error term.  
Model 1 can be used to test hypothesis 1, if the result shows that the coefficient of 
𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is statistically significant, we can accept the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) calculated from the Merton-KMV 
model is a significant statistic to predict default in Chinese market. 
To test hypothesis 2, we construct a dynamic logit model as follows: 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = exp�𝛼+𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1+𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼+𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�  (4.3.2.2) 
where 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of net income to total assets for firm i in year t-1, 
𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total liabilities relative to total assets for firm i in year t-1 and 
𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of a company’s liquid assets to its short-term liabilities for 
firm i in year t-1.  
As we discussed in section 2.2.2 that most studies found financial ratios measuring 
profitability, leverage and liquidity had the most statistical power in differentiating 
defaulted from non-defaulted firms. Since information contained in these financial 
ratios is by no means included in Merton-KMV model, some previous studies argue 
that we can combine these financial ratios with Merton-KMV model to increase the 
predictive power of the Merton-KMV model. For example, Keenan & Sobehart (1999) 
34 
 
found that by adding information such as profitability, we can significantly improve 
upon a model that uses a stricter interpretation of the Merton framework (Keenan & 
Sobehart, 1999). Thus in this paper we will also add financial ratios measuring 
profitability, leverage and liquidity, in conjunction with Merton-KMV model to see if 
we can improve the predictive power of the Merton-KMV model. Again annual data 
is used here. If the results show that 𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1is the only variable that is statistically 
significant, we can accept the null hypothesis and conclude that 𝐷𝐿𝐼 calculated from 
the Merton-KMV model is a sufficient statistic to predict default in Chinese market. 
Before doing this test, we have to examine the significance of the financial ratios in 
predicting default. We cannot improve the predictive power of the Merton-KMV 
model by adding financial ratios that contains no useful information at all. We will 
test the information content of the accounting data with the following model: 
𝑃𝑡−1�𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1� = exp�𝛼+𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1+𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼+𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�         (4.3.2.3) 
We will only use financial ratios that are statistically significant from the regression 
(4.3.2.3) to test hypothesis 2 with model (4.3.2.2).  
To test the third hypothesis, we can include the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) 
and the inputs that are needed to calculate DLI as independent variables. If the result 
shows that 𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  remains statistically significant, we can accept the null 
hypothesis and demonstrate that the functional form used by Merton-KMV model 
does add value for predicting default. Otherwise we can conclude that all the useful 
information in predicting defaults is included in the inputs of the Merton-KMV model 
and the functional form used by Merton-KMV model does not add value for 
predicting default. The dynamic logit model that is used to test hypothesis 3 is 
constructed as follows: 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = exp�𝛼+𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽61/𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1+𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼+𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽61/𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�    (4.2.3.4) 
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where 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the log of the firm’s equity value, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is the log of the firm’s 
debt and 1/𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the inverse of the firm’s equity volatility. All of the three 
variables are important inputs for the Merton-KMV model.  
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5.  Data description  
Table 5.1 summarizes the annual number of defaults as well as the number of total 
listed companies during our sample period in China. The first column shows the total 
number of listed firms in Chinese market, which is computed by summing the listed 
firms from Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for every year. 
The second column indicates the number of defaults each year. And the third column 
is the corresponding percentage of listed firms that are defaulted during the sample 
period.  
Table 5.1 Distributions of the Number of Defaulted Firms by Year 
Year No. of Stocks No. of Defaults (%) 
2001 1160 3 0.26% 
2002 1224 7 0.57% 
2003 1287 4 0.31% 
2004 1377 8 0.58% 
2005 1381 11 0.80% 
2006 1434 6 0.42% 
2007 1550 6 0.39% 
2008 1625 0 0.00% 
2009 1718 0 0.00% 
2010 2165 0 0.00% 
Total number of defaults: 45 
It can be easily seen that although we define default more broadly than American 
academics, the number of defaulted listed firms is still incredibly small.  
Table 5.1 summarizes the full sample of defaults by time in Chinese market during the period from 2001 to 2010; in total there 
are 68 firm delisted from the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, however, among all of the delisted firms 
23 firms are delisted for the reason of M&A and only 45 firms meet our definition of default, i.e. being delisted for financial 
distress. The total number of listed firms per year indicates all the quoted firms which can be obtained from the website of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, however not all the firms are included in our sample due to the data 
availability.  
The defaults reach its peak in 2005. This may partly contributed to the Share Merger 
Reforms in Chinese stock market during 2005 argued in section 3. Historically a 
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majority of Chinese listed companies are owned by the state. And for such 
state-owned listed companies, not all the shares of stock are tradable in the market. 
Intuitively it is easier to manipulate the price for stocks with high non-tradable shares. 
By doing so, companies with bad performance avoid being “punished” by the market. 
In other words, companies that are qualified for default continue to live by 
manipulating the price for stocks. On April 29, 2005, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) announced a reform plan to abolish the split-share structure. 
According to the circular, all listed companies have to choose a suitable time to merge 
their tradable and non-tradable shares. Listed companies which complete the merger 
would be given priority to raise new capital; and all shares in future initial public 
offerings will be tradable. The Share Merger Reforms accelerates the default of the 
problematic firms which used to cover the “bad news”.  
It is also worth noticing here that the number of defaults does not increase in 2007, 
when the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law became effective. In addition, there are no 
defaults during the worldwide financial crisis.  
Table 5.2 summarizes the properties of some main inputs that are needed to calculate 
the DLI and some other potential explanatory variables that are required during the 
testing procedure. Our data set covers most of the companies listed in Chinese market 
during 2000 and 2010 with complete data availabilities. In total there are 7257 
observations in our sample. Among all the observations, 39 firms 25
Column (1) to (2) present descriptive statistics of the three main variables needed to 
calculate the DLI, namely the market value of the firm, E, the face value of the firm’s 
debt, F, and the annualized volatility of the firm’s stock price. It is obvious showed in 
 belong to 
defaulted group. Panel A in Table 5.2 describes variables in our whole sample, Panel 
B reveal a subsample of 7218 surviving observations and Panel C is the defaulted 
group.  
                                                             
25  We report in table 5.1 that there are 45 firms meet our definition of default during our study period, however 
due to the data availability, only 39 of them are include in our sample.  
38 
 
table 5.2 that the mean value of the market capitalization for the surviving group is 
8501.1 million RMB, whereas that for the default group is 6733 million RMB. 
Besides, the mean value of the debt for default group is also smaller than that for the 
surviving group. In other words, compared with the surviving firms, defaulted firms 
have smaller firm size. It can also be seen that the stock value volatility is higher 
within default sample. This gives us the fist impression that the defaulted sample has 
higher risk than the surviving sample.  
Column (4), column (5) and column (6) respectively present descriptive statistics for 
three financial ratios. It is interesting that the mean value of NITA is negative for 
defaulted firms but positive for surviving firms, revealing that defaulted firms in fact 
make losses in average while survival firms are profitable. This discovery matches up 
to our common sense. Column (5) tells us that the mean value of the leverage is much 
higher for defaulted sample than that for surviving sample. This is not surprising since 
defaulted firms are those that are failed to meet their debt obligations, higher level of 
leverage means heavier burden. Last column reveals that generally surviving firms 
have much higher liquidity than defaulted firms, which is also what we expected. 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics for Some Important Variables 
Variables (1) E (2) F (3) σE (4) NITA (5) TLTA  (6) LASTL 
Panel A. Whole Data Set 
Mean 84.590  13.794  0.466  0.050  0.576  1.281  
Std. Dev. 529.812  46.754  0.177  0.106  0.573  0.809  
Min 0.764  0.025  0.117  -2.764  0.054  0.002  
Max 25293.500  1139.640  1.919  2.092  23.799  20.106  
Observations: 7257 
Panel B. Surviving Group 
Mean 85.011  13.850  0.466  0.053  0.558  1.286  
Std. Dev. 531.211  46.873  0.178  0.086  0.346  0.808  
Min 1.487  0.025  0.117  -1.587  0.054  0.028  
Max 25293.500  1139.640  1.919  2.092  16.329  20.106  
Observations: 7218 
Panel C Defaulted Group 
Mean 6.7330  3.4711  0.5010  -0.5140  3.9328  0.3514  
Std. Dev. 5.1611  2.7143  0.0898  0.6535  5.3272  0.3586  
Min 0.7638  0.1162  0.3465  -2.7642  0.3417  0.0023  
Max 23.1494  10.4769  0.7090  0.4326  23.7992  1.7427  
Observations: 39 
This table reports statistics for some important variables used in the Merton-KMV model and the logit model. E is the market value of firm’s equity in million RMB as the product of share price and the number of share 
outstanding. F is the face value of firm’s debt in million RMB as the product of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt. σE
is the annualized volatility of the firm’s equity measured by former two years’ monthly 
data. Colum (4) to column (6) report three financial ratios, saying net income over book value of total assets (NITA), total liability over total asset (TLTA), and liquid asset over short-term liability (LASTL). All the data 
are obtained from the database iFind. Due to the data availability, only 39 defaults are included in our sample. 
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6. 
6.1 Calculation results from the Merton-KMV model  
 Empirical results  
We computer the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) for our whole sample and list 
the results in this section. Table 6.1.1 report the aggregate DLI per year from 2000 to 
2010 and the annual number of observations included in our sample. The aggregate 
DLI is defined as a simple average of the DLI of all firms. As it is argued by Tudela & 
Young (2005) that in principal, the aggregate DLI should be a useful indictor of the 
overall default rate (Tudela & Young, 2005).  
Table 6.1.1 Aggregate DLI by Year from 2000 to 2010 
Year Observations Aggregate DLI 
2001 487 0.0003200  
2002 547 0.0003883  
2003 626 0.0017722  
2004 657 0.0065944  
2005 662 0.0058577  
2006 711 0.0039594  
2007 705 0.0000969  
2008 737 0.0256091  
2009 821 0.0065789  
2010 864 0.0002000  
Table 6.1.1 reveals that the “default probability” is not high for Chinese listed firms
This table reports the aggregate “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) by year from 2000 to 2010. The aggregate DLI is defined 
as the simple average of the DLI of all firms.   
26
                                                             
26 We compare our results with those calculated by using Anglo-American market data and find that generally 
the “default probability” is not high for Chinese listed firms. For example, Vassalou & Xing (2004) figured the 
monthly aggregate DLI for American listed firms from 1971 to 1998 and revealed that most of the monthly 
aggregate DLI are above 0.0202. 
 
but it is increasing year after year. The first dramatic increase is found in 2004 before 
China implements Share Merger Reforms. Since DLI here is a one-year-ahead default 
predictive indicator, high aggregate DLI in 2004 implies that in general the Share 
Merger Reforms in 2005 is expected to accelerate the default of the problematic firms 
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which used to cover the “bad news”. Recalling table 5.1, which reveals that the 
number of defaults increases in 2005, we feel that DLI is probably a powerful 
indicator of defaults. We will test the significance of the DLI in forecasting defaults 
later.  
In addition, there is a huge decrease in 2007, when the new Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law became effective. It seems that the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is expected 
to have a positive effect in Chinese market, however further studies are needed.  
Finally the highest aggregate DLI is found in 2008 when financial crisis reached its 
fever pitch (figure 6.1.1 gives a much clearer overview). Although we reported in 
table 5.1 that in total there are no firms defaulted in 2008, the aggregate DLI is 
extremely high in this year.  
Figure 6.1.1 Aggregate DLI by Year from 2000 to 2010 
 
Table 6.1.2 present the summary statistics of the “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) 
for both defaulted firms and surviving firms. It is showed in table 6.1.2 that defaulted 
group has both larger maximum DLI and minimum DLI than surviving group. And 
not surprisingly, the mean value of DLI for defaulted group is much higher than that 
The aggregate DLI is defined as the simple average of the DLI of all firms.   
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for the surviving group. This finding implies that if we set an appropriate threshold, 
for example, 10%, “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) may be a useful indicator to 
discrepant defaulted firms from surviving firms.   
Table 6.1.2 Comparison of DLI between Defaulted Firms and Surviving Firms 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Defaulted Firms 39 0.095675 0.186856 6.71E-10 1 
Surviving Firms 7218 0.004617 0.020508 0 0.535457 
We report the Type I, cases that the Merton-KMV model fails to predict default when 
it did occur, and Type II errors, where the Merton-KMV model predicts default when 
it did not occur, for different thresholds in table 6.1.3. Since the aggregate DLI is 
generally quite small for Chinese listed firms, we include two extremely low levels of 
threshold in table 6.1.3, respectively 0.01% and 0.1%.  
This table reports statistics for “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) calculated from the Merton-KMV model from 2000 to 
2010.   
Table 6.1.3 Type I & II Errors for Different Thresholds 
Threshold Type I Type II 
0.01% 17.95% 25.92% 
0.10% 30.77% 17.58% 
1% 51.28% 8.63% 
5% 61.54% 2.76% 
10% 71.79% 0.83% 
15% 79.49% 0.39% 
20% 84.62% 0.14% 
25% 89.74% 0.07% 
30% 92.31% 0.06% 
40% 94.87% 0.04% 
50% 97.44% 0.01% 
It is quit intuitive that the lower the threshold the smaller the Type I error but at the 
expense of a greater Type II error. For example, choosing a failure threshold of 0.01%, 
Table 6.1.3 shows Type I & II errors for different thresholds for our whole sample. Type I error is the proportion of companies 
that the Merton-KMV model fails to predict default when it did occur and Type II errors is the proportion of companies that are 
classified as defaulted when they are not.  
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we fail to classify 17.95% of firms as defaulters when they actually went default. At 
this level, the Type II error is 25.92%. With the higher level of 1%, the Type one error 
increases to 51.28% while Type II error decreases to 8.63%. As it is argued by Tudela 
& Young (2005) that in reality the proper threshold is depend on the preference of the 
investors (Tudela & Young, 2005).  
6.2 The regression results  
We stated in section 4 that in order to 1) evaluate the significance of the Merton-KMV 
model; 2) compare the information content of the DLI and financial ratios; 3) test the 
contribution of the functional form used by the Merton-KMV model, we construct  
logit models using an indicator of default as a dependent variable. The indicator of 
default is a dummy variable which takes on the value of unity if the firm were delisted 
for financial reasons, and zero otherwise.  
We first regress the dummy variables on DLI to see if DLI is a useful and sufficient 
indicator to predict default for Chinese listed companies. If the coefficient of the DLI 
is significantly different from zero, we can demonstrate that DLI is a useful variable 
to predict default; otherwise we can conclude that the Merton-KMV model is not an 
appropriate way to forecast default in Chinese market.    
In addition, to compare the information content of the DLI and financial ratios, we 
included DLI as well as financial ratios that are statistically significant in predicting 
default in the regression. If DLI is the only one that is statistically significant, we can 
conclude that DLI is a sufficient statistic for predicting default and all the useful 
information contained in the financial ratios are included in the Merton-KMV model. 
Before doing this test, we have to identify the information content of the accounting 
ratios.  
Finally we examine whether the functional form of the Merton-KMV model add value 
to that provided by its components. To test this hypothesis, we use DLI as well as the 
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important components of the Merton-KMV model in the regression. If the DLI 
remains statistically significant, we can say that the functional form of the 
Merton-KMV is an important construct for forecast default in Chinese market. The 
specific regression models are listed as following. 
Model 1 
𝑃𝑡−1�𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1� = 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + +𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�       
Model 2 
𝑃𝑡−1�𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1�
= exp�𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1� 
Model 3 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1)= exp�𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1� 
Model 4 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1)= exp �𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽61/𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1�1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 �𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽61/𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1� 
The regression results are reported in table 6.2.1. Model in column 1 is a univariate 
model which obtains DLI as the only independent variable. The result shows that the 
covariate is statistically significant at 0.1% level, allowing us to conclude that the DLI 
is an extremely significant default predictor.  
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The model in column 2 is an accounting model that uses financial ratios as 
independent variables. The results reveal that all of the three financial ratios are 
statistically significant with the expected sign. Our findings are similar to those of 
Campbell et al.(2008), which reveal that the ratio of Net Income to Total Assets 
(NINA), total liabilities relative to total assets (TLTA) and the ratio of a company’s 
cash and short-term assets to the market value of its assets (CASHTA), another way to 
measure liquidity, are statistically significant in predicting default. With these findings 
we can continue to test hypothesis 2. Since all the three financial ratios are 
statistically significant, we will combine all of them with DLI as the independent 
variables in the regression to see if we can improve on the Merton-KMV model’s 
implied DLI for forecasting. 
Model 3 adds DLI, in conjunction with the financial ratios measuring profitability, 
leverage and liquidity. The results in column 3 reveal that the coefficients of the DLI 
and the financial ratios are very statistically significant. This finding allows us to 
conclude that we can improve the predictive power of the Merton-KMV model by 
adding financial ratios that measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity. In other 
words we can reject our second hypothesis and conclude that the DLI is not a 
sufficient statistic for default forecasting because.  
The model in column 4 contains the DLI and the main components of the 
Merton-KMV model: the log of the firm’s equity value, the log of the firm’s debt and 
the inverse of the firm’s equity volatility. It is found that the DLI remains statistically 
significant compare with that in model 1, although its coefficient dropped by 
approximately 50%. In addition, the log of the firm’s equity value and the log of the 
firm’s debt are also statistically significant with the expected sign. The results in 
column 4 allow us to conclude that the functional form of the Merton-KMV model is 
as important as the inputs of the Merton-KMV model in predicting default.   
To sum up, table 6.2.1 reveals that the Merton-KMV is a significant method to predict 
default in Chinese market, however it is not a sufficient method. In other words, we 
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can improve the predictive performance of the Merton-KMV model by adding 
financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity. Finally we find that the 
functional form of the Merton-KMV model adds value to that of the inputs for this 
model. 
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Table 6.2.1 Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
DLI 15.29  *** 7.361 6.810*** 
 
** 
(7.75)  (3.80) (2.63) 
NINA  -3.423 -3.151***  *** 
  (-5.36) (-4.94)  
TLTA  0.173 0.188*  * 
  (1.97) (2.20)  
LASTL  -4.086 -3.606***  *** 
  (-5.73) (-4.96)  
lnE    -2.344
 
*** 
   (-8.31) 
lnF    -0.259 
    (-1.25) 
1/σE    -0.683
 
* 
   (-2.43) 
_cons -5.529 -2.537*** -3.065*** 2.320*** 
 
** 
(-30.18) (-5.59) (-6.12) (2.59) 
N 7257 7257 7257 7257 
  
Table 6.2.1 reports the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. DLI is the implied “Default Likelihood Indicators”. NINA is the ratio of Net Income to Total 
Assets. TLTA is the total liabilities relative to total assets. LASTA is the ratio of a company’s liquid assets to its short-term liability. lnE is the log of the firm’s equity value. lnF is the log of the firm’s debt. 1/σE
 is the 
inverse of the firm’s equity volatility.  
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6.3 Power curve  
Referring to Tudela & Young (2005), we now in this section evaluate the ability of the 
Merton-KMM model and other two different models to rank defaulted firms and 
surviving firms using power curve. From the regressions above, we can construct an 
accounting model that includes pure financial ratios and a hybrid model that is a mix 
of DLI and financial ratios, which are listed as follows: 
Accounting model 
𝑃𝑡−1�𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1�
= exp�−2.537 − 3.423 ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.173 ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 − 4.086 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1�1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝�−2.537 − 3.423 ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.173 ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 − 4.086 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1� 
Hybrid model 
𝑃𝑡−1�𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1� = 
exp�−3.065 − 7.361 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − 3.151 ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.188 ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 − 3.606 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1�1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝�−3.065 − 7.361 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − 3.151 ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.188 ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ −3.606 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1� 
First we calculated the probability of default (𝑃𝑡−1) for our whole sample using the 
model. We then rank the companies by probability of default from the highest to 
lowest along the horizon axis. Next, for a given percentage of this sample we 
calculate the cumulative number of defaulters picked up by the model as a proportion 
of the total number of defaulted firms in our sample, and plot the cumulative 
proportion on the vertical axis.  
As it is described by Tudela & Young (2005) that plotting the power curve for a 
random model will give us a 45 degree line since intuitively a random model will pick 
up 1% of the total defaults for the first percentile while for the most powerful model, 
all the defaulters should be included within the riskiest percentile. In other words, the 
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better the model in predicting defaults, the more bowed towards the upper-left corner 
its power curve will be.  
The power curves for the Merton-KMV model, the accounting model and the hybrid 
model are plotted in figure 6.3.1. Since all the power curves are plotted by using the 
same sample, we can compare the power of the three different models.  
Figure 6.3.1 shows that the hybrid model outperforms both the Merton-KMV model 
and the pure accounting model, indicating that a combination of the DLI and financial 
ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity does add value to that of the 
Merton-KMV model.  
Figure 6.3.1 Power Curve 
 
In addition, the Merton-KMV model performs better than accounting data. As it is 
argued by Vassalou & Xing (2004) that the reasons might be: 1) the volatility of the 
firm’s assets contains important information about the firm’s default risk, however 
accounting models do not take into account the volatility of the firm’s assets in 
estimating its default risk as the Merton-KMV model does; 2) accounting models use 
the accounting data from historical financial statement which is inherently backward 
The vertical axis is the percentiles for the whole sample rating from the riskiest firms to the safest firms while horizontal axis is 
the cumulative ratio of the number of defaulter within this percentile to the total number of defaulter in our sample.  
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looking while the Merton-KMV model applies the market value of the firm’s equ ity, 
which reflects the expectation of the firm’s future performance. 
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7.  Conclusions 
The main purposes of this paper are: 1) calculate the “Default Likelihood Indicators” 
(DLI) of the Chinese listed firms by using the Merton-KMV model; 2) estimate the 
whether we can improve the predictive power of Merton-KMV model by adding some 
financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity; 3) test whether the 
functional form of the Merton-KMV model adds value to that of the inputs for the 
model.  
Including 7,257 observations from 2000 to 2010 in our sample, we find that the 
annual aggregate “Default Likelihood Indicators” (DLI) for Chinese listed companies 
is lower than that of the Anglo-American firms.  
To test whether the Merton-KMV model is a significant and sufficient method in 
predict default in Chinese market, we construct some econometric models. The 
regression results reveal that the Merton-KMV is a significant method to predict 
default in Chinese market but it is not a sufficient method. We can improve the 
predictive performance of the Merton-KMV model by adding financial ratios 
measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity in the econometric model. In addition, 
Merton-KMV model is significant in predicting default not only because that some of 
the inputs are useful, but also because that the functional form of the Merton-KMV 
model adds value to that of the inputs for the model. 
Finally we draw the power curve for the Merton-KMV model, the pure accounting 
model and a hybrid model that combine DLI calculated from the Merton-KMV model 
and financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage and liquidity. We find that hybrid 
model outperforms the other two models and the accounting model is the weakest one. 
The finding proves what we revealed, saying we can improve the Merton-KMV 
model by adding accounting data.  
Some limitations are remained in this paper. First, some of the assumptions may be 
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too strong. For example, we assume that the firm’s asset follows geometric Brownian 
motion. This may be violated in the reality. Applying the KMV’s proprietary database 
that translate the “Distance to Default” (DD) of the firm to the “Expected Default 
Frequency” (EDF) can solve this problem, however this database is not available for 
public use and it may not suitable for Chinese firms since it is based on the 
observations of America firms. Second, our results may be biased due to the 
insufficiency of defaults included in our studies. The problem of data insufficiency is 
always a problem for researcher who wants to study Chinese market due to the 
China’s special institutional environment.  
There are several areas for future research. One extension of the paper is to 
explore how the special institutional background shapes various corporate behaviors. 
We mentioned in section 5 that the aggregate DLI increases in 2004 before China 
implements the Share Merger Reforms. We think it is because Chinese listed firms 
tend to cover “bad news” and the Share Merger Reforms enforce them to convey all 
the information to the public thus the “bad news” that used to be under ground is now 
converged into the price. This implication needs to be proved by further studies. In 
addition, there is a huge decrease in 2007, when the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
became effective. It seems that the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is expected to 
have a positive effect in Chinese market, still further studies are needed. Second, we 
describe in section 2 that there is another branch of models based on bond market and 
the Merton-KMV model tends to outperforms bond market based models. However 
we do not unfolded this topic in our study. Further studies are encouraged to compare 
these two types of models and test whether we can improve the predictive power of 
the Merton-KMV model by combining data from both equity market and bond 
market.  
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